Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/307536 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Business Economics [ISSN:] 1861-8928 [Volume:] 94 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 543-577
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
We provide a parsimonious model of leadership in social dilemma situations and test it with a meta-analysis of experimental studies. We focus on studies with treatments that allow for sequential contributions to a public good [as in Güth et al. (J Public Econ 91:1023–1042, 2007)]. The group members observe the contribution of a leader before contributing themselves. We compare the results with simultaneous contribution treatments from the same studies. Our results confirm that the establishment of a leader indeed leads to persistently higher and more coordinated contributions. As predicted, the aggregate effect remains stable over time and increases in group size even though leaders and followers have more divergent contribution patterns in larger groups. We also find empirical support for an explanation of the observed 'leader's curse'.
Subjects: 
Leading-by-example
Cooperation
Meta-analysis
Voluntary contribution
JEL: 
C92
C71
B40
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.