Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/307170 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17346
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Research Question/ Issue: Do large, within-firm executive pay differences hurt firm performance? Prior literature shows mixed results concerning the sign of the relationship between executive pay disparity and firm performance. This study evaluates that literature, clarifies what tournament theory predicts about the relationship, identifies methodological pitfalls and how to address them, and guides future scholarship in this area of considerable importance to firms and policy makers. Research Findings/ Insights: We estimate the relationship using improved methodology and find evidence of an inverted-U shaped relationship between the executive pay spread and firm performance. However, the peak of this inverted U occurs at such a high level of the executive pay spread that it is practically irrelevant in most firms. The inverted U is found using a market-based measure of firm performance, but not a returns-based measure (i.e., ROA). Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study addresses the theoretical and empirical limitations of the prior literature, thereby providing more credible estimates of the relationship between pay disparity and firm performance. Tournament theory offers a unified framework that can explain an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the executive pay spread and firm performance. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our results should reduce public concerns that CEOs increase their own compensation to exorbitant levels, to the detriment of firm performance.
Subjects: 
executive compensation
vertical pay disparity
firm performance
tournament theory
market structure
JEL: 
G32
G39
J31
M12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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