Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/307090 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theory and Decision [ISSN:] 1573-7187 [Volume:] 96 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1-17
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
We report the results of an experimental test of whether preaching the normative appeal of the sure-thing principle leads decision-makers to make choices that satisfy it. We use Allais-type decision problems to observe the incentive-compatible choices of 147 subjects, which either violate the sure-thing principle or adhere to it. Subjects are presented with normative arguments that support the counterfactual behaviour and then repeat their decisions. We observe violations of the sure-thing principle are robust to its normative justification. This result replicates a famous small-sample observation using hypothetical tasks that was published by Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky almost half a century ago. We argue that this finding is as relevant now as it was then and that their design can be usefully applied to address contemporary issues in behavioural economics.
Subjects: 
Expected utility theory
Sure-thing principle
Allais Paradox
Normative decision theory
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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