Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/306919 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Computational Economics [ISSN:] 1572-9974 [Volume:] 61 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1433-1476
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
Contemporary debates about scientific institutions and practice feature many proposed reforms. Most of these require increased efforts from scientists. But how do scientists' incentives for effort interact? How can scientific institutions encourage scientists to invest effort in research? We explore these questions using a game-theoretic model of publication markets. We employ a base game between authors and reviewers, before assessing some of its tendencies by means of analysis and simulations. We compare how the effort expenditures of these groups interact in our model under a variety of settings, such as double-blind and open review systems. We make a number of findings, including that open review can increase the effort of authors in a range of circumstances and that these effects can manifest in a policy-relevant period of time. However, we find that open review's impact on authors' efforts is sensitive to the strength of several other influences.
Subjects: 
Agent-based model
Double-blind peer review
Evolutionary game theory
Open review
Publication markets
Simulation
JEL: 
C63
C73
D47
D58
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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