Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30683 
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dc.contributor.authorBierbrauer, Felixen
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-17-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:24:00Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:24:00Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30683-
dc.description.abstractWe study a large economy model in which individuals have private information about their productive abilities and their preferences. Moreover, there is aggregate uncertainty so that the social benefits from taxation and public goods provision are a priori unknown. The analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that imposes a requirement of robustness with respect to individual beliefs and a requirement of coalition-proofness. The paper provides a tractable and intuitive characterization of incentive-feasible tax and expenditure policies: Incentive constraints associated with productive abilities reflect only individual behavior, whereas those associated with public goods preferences reflect only collective behavior.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2701en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordoptimal taxationen
dc.subject.keywordpublic goods provisionen
dc.subject.keywordrevelation of preferencesen
dc.subject.keywordrobust mechanism designen
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwMechanismen
dc.subject.stwOffenbarte Präferenzenen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOptimal income taxation and public goods provision in a large economy with aggregate uncertainty-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn604953526en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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