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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1262
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
Extending the power-to-take game, we explore the impact of two forces that may shape retaliation. In our 2x2 design, i) in addition to taking, the proposers can give part of their endowment to the responders, and ii) in addition to destroying their own endowment in retaliation, the responders can destroy the proposer's endowment. Although these added options lead the responders to retaliate more severely, they do not significantly influence the proposers' behavior. It is only when the proposers can give, and the responders can concurrently destroy the endowment of the proposers that the proposers take significantly less from the responders.
Schlagwörter: 
power-to-take
giving
emotions
retaliation
experiment
JEL: 
A12
C72
C91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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