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dc.contributor.authorLessmann, Christianen
dc.contributor.authorMarkwardt, Guntheren
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-21-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:49Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:49Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30667-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines whether the federal structure of aid-receiving countries matters in explaining aid effectiveness. Following the decentralization theorem, the devolution of powers should increase aid effectiveness, since local decision-makers are better informed about local needs. At the same time, decentralization has reverse effects, e.g., through coordination problems, excessive regulation, administrative costs and local capture. Using panel data for up to 60 countries, we find that aid is less effective or even harmful in decentralized countries. Our results imply that donor countries should carefully consider how both anti-poverty instruments - financial assistance and decentralization - work together.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2805en
dc.subject.jelO10en
dc.subject.jelO20en
dc.subject.jelO40en
dc.subject.jelH70en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordforeign aiden
dc.subject.keywordgrowthen
dc.subject.keyworddecentralizationen
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungshilfeen
dc.subject.stwDezentralisierungen
dc.subject.stwFöderalismusen
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungen
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren
dc.titleAid, growth and devolution-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn61076442Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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