Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30653 
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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en
dc.contributor.authorMorath, Florianen
dc.contributor.authorMüller, Wielanden
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-26-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:40Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30653-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales taxes in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behavior of a monopolist.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2880en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelH22en
dc.subject.jelL12en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtax incidenceen
dc.subject.keywordmonopolyen
dc.subject.keywordBertrand competitionen
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.titleTaxation and market power-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn617122202en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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