Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30653
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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMorath, Florianen_US
dc.contributor.authorMüller, Wielanden_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:40Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30653-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales taxes in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behavior of a monopolist.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2880en_US
dc.subject.jelC92-
dc.subject.jelH22en_US
dc.subject.jelL12en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtax incidenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordmonopolyen_US
dc.subject.keywordBertrand competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.titleTaxation and market poweren_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn617122202en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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