Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305820 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Game Theory [ISSN:] 1432-1270 [Volume:] 52 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1291-1316
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
In our cheap-talk setting, an expert privately observes multiple binary signals, her soft evidence, about a continuous state of the world and then communicates with a decision-maker. While direct transmission of evidence entails communicating the underlying signals, indirect transmission of evidence entails communicating a summary statistic of her evidence. We first establish that fully informative equilibria exist if the conflict of interest is small. Otherwise, direct transmission of evidence is impossible, as withholding one part of the soft evidence in the communication necessarily induces incentives to manipulate the report on the other part. On the contrary, indirect transmission of evidence remains partially informative for intermediate conflicts of interest. Finally, we introduce the possibility of certification. We show that, if the costs of certification are low, the expert can fully reveal her evidence regardless of the conflict of interest.
Subjects: 
Cheap talk
Soft evidence
Imperfect information
Strategic communication
Certification
JEL: 
C72
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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