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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Gersbach, Hans | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-11-17 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T08:22:47Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T08:22:47Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30577 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two equilibria, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x2834 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | elections | en |
dc.subject.keyword | campaign contributions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | interest groups | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wahlkampf | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wahlkampffinanzierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Interessenpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gleichgewicht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Campaigns, political mobility, and communication | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 612915689 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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