Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30525 
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dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarleen
dc.contributor.authorStähler, Franken
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-02-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:20:36Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:20:36Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30525-
dc.description.abstractThis paper generalizes the frequently used Hotelling model for two-sided markets in order to determine the equilibrium market shares. We show that advertisement levels depend neither on the media price nor on the location of the media firm. An increase in advertising revenues does not change location but only the media price. If the distribution of consumers is asymmetric, market shares will be asymmetric as well, and the media firm with the larger market share charges the higher media price. The larger firm makes a higher profit per reader and in aggregate compared to its smaller rival.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2737en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordHotellingen
dc.subject.keywordgeneral density functionen
dc.subject.keywordmediaen
dc.subject.keywordlocationen
dc.subject.stwMedienökonomiken
dc.subject.stwOligopolen
dc.subject.stwMarktstrukturen
dc.subject.stwMarktanteilen
dc.subject.stwHotelling Modellen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleMarket shares in two-sided media industries-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn608011185en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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