Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30440 
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dc.contributor.authorFiva, Jon H.en
dc.contributor.authorNatvik, Gisle Jamesen
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-31-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:19:38Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:19:38Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30440-
dc.description.abstractWe identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers' re-election probabilities and explore empirically how this variation affects the incumbents' investment in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This aligns with a theoretical framework where political parties disagree about which public goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital. Key for the consistency between data and theory is to account for complementarity between physical capital and flow variables in government production.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2709en
dc.subject.jelE62en
dc.subject.jelH40en
dc.subject.jelH72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economicsen
dc.subject.keywordstrategic capital accumulationen
dc.subject.keywordidentifying popularity shocksen
dc.subject.stwInfrastrukturinvestitionen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Investitionen
dc.subject.stwWiederwahlen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDo re-election probabilities influence public investment?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn605748527en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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