Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/300966 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17070
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We show that ordinary appointments can act as effective substitutes for hard commitment devices and increase demand for a critical healthcare service, particularly among those with self-control problems. We show this using an experiment that randomly offered HIV testing appointments and hard commitment devices to high-risk men in Malawi. Appointments more than double testing rates, with effects concentrated among those who demand commitment. In contrast, most men who take up hard commitments lose their investments. Appointments overcome commitment problems without the potential drawback of commitment failure, and have the potential to increase demand for healthcare in the developing world.
Schlagwörter: 
appointments
commitment devices
self-control
health
HIV
JEL: 
D81
I15
O12
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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