Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/298587 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2024:1
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
4207 In a recent paper, Fack et al. (2019, American Economic Review) convincingly argue and theoretically demonstrate that there may be strong incentives for students to play non-truth-telling strategies when reporting preferences over schools, even when the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm is employed. Their statistical test also rejects the (weak) truth-telling assumption in favour of another assumption, called stability, using a single data set on school choice in Paris. This paper uses Swedish school choice data and replicates their empirical finding in 52 of the 58 investigated data sets (P-value threshold 0.05).
Subjects: 
school choice
deferred acceptance algorithm
truth-telling
stability
replication study
JEL: 
D12
D82
I23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.