Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/293990 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFR Working Paper No. 21-02
Versionsangabe: 
This Version: April 2024
Verlag: 
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
We show that productivity at both the firm and employee (i.e., analyst and inventor) level temporarily declines upon announcements of takeover rumors that do not materialize. Such speculative news may hurt productivity because uncertainty and threat of job loss cause anxiety, distraction, and reduced commitment among employees and managers. Consistently, we observe a more pronounced productivity dip for rumored targets and when the likelihood of job loss is higher. Firm performance mirrors these results. We find no indication of reverse causality. The evidence fosters our understanding of potential real effects of speculative financial news and the costs of takeover threats.
Schlagwörter: 
Employee commitment and distraction
Employee and firm productivity
Firm performance
Takeover speculation
Threat of job loss
JEL: 
D24
G00
G34
J24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
881.05 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.