Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/293887 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital [ISSN:] 2199-1235 [Volume:] 53 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 187-220
Verlag: 
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
The financial clout of global sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) is massive, and many of these are controlled by authoritarian regimes. It cannot be ruled out that these funds might take shareholding positions in banks which play key roles in other countries. This paper studies the extent to which SWFs have the potential ability to use shareholdings in critical banks as mechanisms to exert influence on other countries' banking systems, taking a comparative approach in considering the five smallest EU member states: Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The study concludes that SWFs would, in many cases, need to dedicate only a tiny portion of their assets in order to gain significant potential for influence within these countries.
Schlagwörter: 
Swedbank
SEB
Luminor
Sovereign Wealth Funds
Bank of Cyprus
Bank of Valletta
Critical Infrastructure
Banking Systems
Significant Banks
Mediterranean
Baltics
JEL: 
G21
G15
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.