Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288478 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Experimental Economics [ISSN:] 1573-6938 [Volume:] 24 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 177-205
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
We present an interactive eye-tracking study that explores the strategic use of gaze. We analyze gaze behavior in an experiment with four simple games. The game can either be a competitive (hide & seek) game in which players want to be unpredictable, or a game of common interest in which players want to be predictable. Gaze is transmitted either in real time to another subject, or it is not transmitted and therefore non-strategic. We find that subjects are able to interpret non-strategic gaze, obtaining substantially higher payoffs than subjects who do not see gaze. If gaze is transmitted in real time, gaze becomes more informative in the common interest games and players predominantly succeed to coordinate on efficient outcomes. In contrast, gaze becomes less informative in the competitive game.
Subjects: 
Eye-tracking
Focal points
Signaling
Hide & seek
JEL: 
C91
D01
D83
D87
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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