Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288431 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Experimental Economics [ISSN:] 1573-6938 [Volume:] 23 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1129-1147
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
Experiments involving games have two dimensions of difficulty for subjects in the laboratory. One is understanding the rules and structure of the game and the other is forming beliefs about the behavior of other players. Typically, these two dimensions cannot be disentangled as belief formation crucially depends on the understanding of the game. We present the one-player guessing game, a variation of the two-player guessing game (Grosskopf and Nagel 2008), which turns an otherwise strategic game into an individual decision-making task. The results show that a majority of subjects fail to understand the structure of the game. Moreover, subjects with a better understanding of the structure of the game form more accurate beliefs of other player’s choices, and also better-respond to these beliefs.
Subjects: 
Guessing game
Strategic thinking
Cognitive sophistication
JEL: 
C91
D12
D84
G11
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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