Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288328 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade [ISSN:] 1573-7012 [Volume:] 21 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 33-42
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine the strategic use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Cournot competition between two firms that differ in their marginal costs of production. The level of CSR determines the weight a firm puts on consumer surplus in its objective function before it decides upon supply. We show that the more efficient firm chooses a higher CSR level, reinforcing its dominant position. If there are sufficiently large fixed costs of CSR, only the more efficient firm will engage in CSR.
Schlagwörter: 
Corporate social responsibility
Cournot duopoly
Asymmetric costs
Heterogenous firms
JEL: 
D43
L13
L21
L22
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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