Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288274 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Experimental Economics [ISSN:] 1573-6938 [Volume:] 24 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 919-951
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
We report experimental evidence showing a positive effect of redistribution on economic efficiency via the self-enforcement of property rights, and identify which status groups benefit more and which less. We model an economy in which wealth is produced if players voluntarily comply with the—efficient but inequitable—prevailing social order. We vary exogenously whether redistribution is feasible, and how it is organized. We find that redistribution benefits all status groups as property disputes recede. It is most effective when transfers are not discretionary but instead imposed by some exogenous administration. In the absence of coercive means to enforce property rights, it is the higher status groups, not the lower status groups, who benefit from redistribution being compulsory rather than voluntary.
Subjects: 
Redistribution
Property
Status
Correlated equilibrium
Battle of the sexes
Experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
D74
H23
P48
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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