Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/287533 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of the Economic Science Association [ISSN:] 2199-6776 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 64-73
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
Internet services are often free of charge but ask for customers' personal data in exchange for usage. We experimentally study whether the provision of information-based public goods is susceptible to restraint when contributions not only make contributors better off but also enable a non-contributing "big player" to acquire substantial profits. We show that the presence of the big player crowds out the willingness to provide neutral tokens, but no such effect is observed for the provision of private information. Hence, collecting anonymized personal data instead of monetary fees can be more profitable to service providers and create greater benefits for customers.
Subjects: 
Information public good
Sharing information
Personal data
Asymmetric benefits
Internet service providers
JEL: 
C91
D03
D64
D82
H41
M31
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.