Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/287367 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Business Economics [ISSN:] 1861-8928 [Volume:] 91 [Issue:] 8 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1125-1148
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
This study investigates if and how the influence of compensation interdependence on risk-taking depends on mutual monitoring of risky investment decisions. We argue that individuals under compensation interdependence have a behavioral incentive for higher risk-taking if mutual monitoring is present. Impression management is hypothesized to be the driving force behind this effect, with the visibility of actions to the peers through mutual monitoring as an important prerequisite. The results of a laboratory experiment support our predictions. Additional analyses reveal that impression management drives our results because participants incorporate their peers' preferences in their decision process. This reasoning is further substantiated as individuals increase their risk-taking if they took less risk than their peers in previous experimental rounds and thus adjust to their respective peer group. Our findings inform firms about the effect of compensation interdependence in working environments with differing opportunities for mutual monitoring.
Subjects: 
Risk-taking
Compensation interdependence
Mutual monitoring
Impression management
Social reasoning
JEL: 
M12
M41
M52
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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