Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286847 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Evolutionary Economics [ISSN:] 1432-1386 [Volume:] 31 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1291-1315
Verlag: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Decline and break-up of institutionalized cooperation, at all levels, has occurred frequently. Some of its concomitants, such as international migration, have become topical in the globalized world. Aspects of the phenomenon have also become known as failing states. However, the focus in most social sciences has been on institutional emergence and persistence, not collapse. We develop an endogenous explanation of collapsing institutions. Collapse may be an implication of the very economic success of institutionalized cooperation and of increasing system complexity, when cognitive conditions for effective collective decision-making do not proportionately evolve. Moreover, we show that collapse is not a simple logical reverse of emergence. Rather, institutions break up at different factor constellations than the ones prevailing at emergence. We approach endogenous institutional break-up and its asymmetry from various paradigmatic and disciplinary perspectives, employing psychology, anthropology, network analysis, and institutional economics. These perspectives cover individuals, groups, interaction-arenas, populations, and social networks.
Schlagwörter: 
Anthropology
Cognitive capacities
Cooperation
Economic decline
Game theory
Institutional emergence
Network analysis
Social institutions
JEL: 
A12
B52
C72
D02
D03
L14
O15
O43
Z13
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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