Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/285101 
Title (translated): 
Ventas exclusivas en presencia de una empresa verticalmente integrada
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 50 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 5-30
Publisher: 
Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía, Santiago de Chile
Abstract: 
This study constructs a successive Cournot model to investigate the possibility that a separated upstream input supplier can solely sell the intermediate good to a separated downstream manufacturer through an exclusive contract in the presence of a vertically integrated rival. We find that the separated firms are indifferent on whether to sign the exclusive contract or not if the downstream party is less efficient than the integrated firm in producing the final good. Next, the separated firms with an efficient downstream party are indifferent between signing or not signing, willing to sign, and not willing to sign the exclusive contract if the upstream cost differential is relatively low, medium, and high, respectively. Finally, signing such an exclusive contract does not increase consumer surplus and social welfare.
Subjects: 
Exclusive dealing
vertical integration
successive Cournot model
JEL: 
L12
L41
L42
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-sa Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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