Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284248 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
IFS Working Papers No. 23/22
Publisher: 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), London
Abstract: 
We consider optimal anonymous consumption taxes in situations where the magnitude of an externality varies with individuals who cause it. For instance, urban fuel consumers generate greater pollution damages compared to rural consumers, but both groups are subjected to the same fuel tax. We provide a condition for the validity of the targeting principle, where external concerns are only addressed through the tax imposed on the commodity responsible for the externality. When this condition holds, one can separate the equity/efficiency and environmental components of this tax. An illustration suggests that Pigovian considerations would explain most of the fuel tax in France.
Subjects: 
targeting principle
local externality
pollution
Pigoviantax
commodity taxes
JEL: 
H21
H23
D12
Q53
Q54
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
748.54 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.