Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/283412 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics No. 2023-16
Publisher: 
University of Innsbruck, Research Platform Empirical and Experimental Economics (eeecon), Innsbruck
Abstract: 
This paper investigates whether distributional conflicts become more likely when groups are involved in the fight. We present results from a laboratory experiment in which two parties can appropriate resources via a contest or, alternatively, take an outside option. Keeping monetary gains expected from fighting constant across all treatments, the experiment compares conflict choices of players in two-against-two, one-against-one, and two-against-one settings. Overall, we find evidence for a higher propensity to opt for conflict when entering the fight in a group than when having to fight as a single player. The effects are strongest in endogenously maintained groups and in the presence of group size advantages (i.e., in two-against-one). The results can be explained by a stronger non-monetary utility from fighting in (endogenous) groups and coincide with a biased perception of the fighting strength in asymmetric conflict.
Subjects: 
Conflict
contest
conflict resolution
group decision-making
group identity
alliance
experiment
JEL: 
C92
D70
D72
D74
D91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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