Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282861 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2023-048/I
Publisher: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Abstract: 
Governments, central banks, and private organizations frequently face the challenge of convincing their audience to take a specific action. One key choice is whether to send a public message that can coordinate the audience's actions or to rely instead on private messages that may differ across audience members and thereby miscoordinate actions. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to test whether public or private messages are more persuasive and how this depends on the audience's strategic environment. In the experiment, public signals are most persuasive. The results match the theoretical prediction that public persuasion works best when the receivers' strategic environment features strategic complements. However, contrary to theory, public signals are equally persuasive as private ones under strategic substitutes. Senders respond to this pattern by engaging more frequently in public communication, especially when the receivers' environment features strategic complements.
Subjects: 
information design
Bayesian persuasion
laboratory experiment
Bayes correlated equilibria
obedience
recommendations
JEL: 
D83
D82
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
4.96 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.