Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282166 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 475
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Traditionally, incentives to promote behavioral change are assigned rather than chosen. In this paper, we theoretically and empirically investigate the alternative approach of letting people choose their own incentives from a menu of increasingly challenging and rewarding options. When individuals are heterogeneous and have private information about their costs and benefits, we theoretically show that leaving them the choice of incentives can improve both adherence and welfare. We test the theoretical predictions in a field experiment based on daily meditation sessions. We randomly assign some participants to one of two incentive schemes and allow others to choose between the two schemes. As predicted, participants sort into schemes in (partial) agreement with the objectives of the policy maker. However, in contrast to our prediction, participants who could choose complete significantly fewer sessions than participants that were randomly assigned. Since the results are not driven by poor selection, we infer that letting people choose between incentive schemes may bring in psychological effects that discourage adherence.
Schlagwörter: 
monetary incentives
dynamic incentives
field experiment
mental health
JEL: 
C09
D03
D08
I01
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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