Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282163 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 472
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We study whether one reason behind female underrepresentation in leadership is that female leaders are less effective at coordinating followers' actions. Two experiments using coordination games investigate whether female leaders are less successful than males in persuading followers to coordinate on efficient equilibria. In these settings, successful coordination hinges on higher-order beliefs about the leader's capacity to convince followers to pursue desired actions, making beliefs that women are less effective leaders potentially self-confirming. We find no evidence that such bias impacts actual leadership performance, precisely estimating the absence of a gender leadership gap. We further show that this result is surprising given experts' priors.
Schlagwörter: 
gender
coordination games
leadership
experiment
JEL: 
D23
C72
C92
J1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.24 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.