Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282155 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 464
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
For reward-based crowdfunding, we introduce the strategy-proof Generalized Moulin-Shenker mechanism (GMS) and compare its performance to the prevailing All-Or-Nothing mechanism (AON). Theoretically, GMS outperforms AON in equilibrium profit and funding success. We test these predictions experimentally, distinguishing between a sealed-bid and a dynamic version of GMS. We find that the dynamic GMS outperforms the sealed-bid GMS. It performs better than AON when the producer aims at maximizing funding success. For crowdfunding in practice, this suggests that the current standard of financing projects may be improved upon by implementing a crowdfunding mechanism that is similar to the dynamic GMS.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
2.21 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.