Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282139 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 448
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
This paper examines the consequences of a government mimicking the policy of its competitor by studying the introduction of the welfare state in 19th century Germany. The reform conducted by the conservative government targeted blue-collar workers and aimed to reduce the success of the socialist party. The result based on a difference-in-differences design shows that the socialist party benefited in elections due to the reform. The analysis of the mechanism points to the socialist's issue ownership by strengthening its reform orientation, which voters followed. The results are not driven by other political and economic channels related to the reform.
Subjects: 
welfare state
socialism
government
opposition
issue ownership
voting behavior
Germany
JEL: 
D74
H53
I38
N44
P16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
1.26 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.