Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282107 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 415
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
Combining a theoretical model of imperfect information with empirical evidence, we show how the effect of providing price information to consumers depends on how well informed they are beforehand. Theoretically, an increase in consumer information decreases prices more, the fewer ex ante informed consumers there are. Empirically, we study mandatory price disclosure in the German fuel market for two fuel types that differ in ex ante consumer information. The decline in prices is stronger when there are fewer ex ante informed consumers. The magnitude of the treatment effect declines over time but is intensified by local follow-on information campaigns.
Subjects: 
mandatory price disclosure
consumer information
retail fuel market
JEL: 
D83
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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