Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278954 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16256
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We evaluate a comprehensive reform of Norwegian early retirement institutions in 2011 through the lens of a parsimonious random utility choice model. The reform radically changed work incentives and/or pension access-age for some (but not all) workers. We find that improved work incentives caused employment to rise considerably, at the expense of both early retirement and exits through disability insurance. Lower access-age to own pension funds caused a small increase in employment and a large drop in disability program participation. Properly designed pension reforms thus need to take the interplay between old age pension and disability insurance programs into account.
Subjects: 
pension reform
disability insurance
program substitution
JEL: 
H55
J22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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