Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278552 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2306
Verlag: 
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics, Linz
Zusammenfassung: 
Consider a repeated principal-agent setting with verifiable effort and an extra profit that can materialize only if the agent is talented. The agent is overconfident and updates beliefs using Bayes’ rule. The agent's principal-expected compensation decreases over time until high talent is revealed; thus he may be employed only if beliefs are sufficiently low. We apply these results to a firm's promotion policy, which may be based on success in a previous job even if jobs are uncorrelated. This provides an explanation for the "Peter Principle" in a setting with verifiable performance and highly confident workers (Benson et al., 2019).
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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