Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278524 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Working Paper No. HEIDWP09-2023
Verlag: 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva
Zusammenfassung: 
Should a government have more than one fiscal rule constraining fiscal aggregates? If so, why? In this paper, we present a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy featuring an incumbent government to assess how and why implementing a budget balance rule and a debt anchor rule is non-redundant and welfare-improving. Our findings suggest that the implementation of a combination of fiscal rules is optimally preferred over a single rule, as each rule has a different effect on credibility and fiscal behaviour. While the debt anchor rule prevents the propagation of the negative effects of imperfect fiscal credibility, the operational rule reduces amplification by avoiding overindebtedness and minimizing the welfare-detrimental effects arising from a deficit-biased government.
Schlagwörter: 
Fiscal Rules
Credibility
Deficit Bias
Balanced Budget Rule
Debt Anchor Rule
Fiscal Policy
Welfare
JEL: 
E61
E62
H60
H63
F41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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