Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/275683 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2023-305r
Version Description: 
August 2023
Publisher: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Abstract: 
We study a version of a canonical model of attacks against political regimes where agents have an expressive utility for taking political stances that is scaled by the salience of political decision-making. Increases in political salience can have divergent effects on regime stability depending on costs of being on the losing side. When regimes have weak sanctioning mechanisms, middling levels of salience can pose the greatest threat, as regime supporters are insufficiently motivated to act on their preferences and regime opponents are sufficiently motivated to stop conforming. Our results speak to the phenomenon of charged debates about democracy by identifying conditions under which heightened interest in political decision-making can pose a threat to democracy in and of itself.
Subjects: 
Democracy
salience
insurgence
JEL: 
C72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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