Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27317 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 793
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the listing decisions of a retailer who may ask her suppliers to make upfront payments in order to be listed. We consider a sequential game with upfront payments being negotiated before short-term delivery contracts. We show that the retailer is more likely to use upfront payments the higher her bargaining power and the higher the number of potential suppliers. Upfront payments tend to lower the number of products offered by the retailer when the products are rather close substitutes. However, upfront payments can increase social welfare if they ameliorate inefficient listing decisions implied by short-term contracts only.
Schlagwörter: 
Buyer power
upfront payments
retailing
JEL: 
L14
L42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
311.66 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.