Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/270846 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
CFS Working Paper Series No. 707
Publisher: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
The discount control mechanisms that closed-end funds often choose to adopt before IPO are supposedly implemented to narrow the difference between share price and net asset value, We find evidence that non-discretionary discount control mechanisms such as mandatory continuation votes serve as costly signals of information to reveal higher fund quality to investors, Rents of the skill signaled through the announcement of such policies accrue to managers rather than investors as differences in skill are revealed through growing assets under management rather than risk-adjusted performance.
Subjects: 
Closed-end funds
discount
performance
skill
signaling
information asymmetry
repurchases
continuation vote
Closed-end funds
JEL: 
G10
G23
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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