Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/270660 
Editors: 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Publisher: 
Oxford University Press, Oxford
Abstract: 
Why do governments in some developing countries implement international standards, while others do not? Focusing on the politics of bank regulation, this book develops a new framework to explain regulatory interdependence between countries in the core and the periphery of the global financial system. Drawing on in-depth analysis of eleven countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, it shows how financial globalization generates strong reputational and competitive incentives for developing countries to converge on international standards. Regulatory interdependence is generated by relations between regulators, politicians, and banks within developing countries, and international actors including investors, peer regulators, and international financial institutions. We explain why it is that some configurations of domestic politics and forms of integration into global finance generate convergence with international standards, while other configurations lead to divergence. This book contributes to our understanding of the ways in which governments and firms in the core of global finance powerfully shape regulatory politics in the periphery, and the ways in which peripheral governments and firms manoeuvre within the constraints and opportunities created by financial globalization
Subjects: 
Africa
Asia
Latin America
financial globalization
regulatory interdependence
international banking standards
Basel I
Basel II
Basel III
transnational policy networks
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-0-19-884199-9
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Book
Document Version: 
Published Version

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