Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26938 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2008,1
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Should the European Union grant state aid through an institution like the European Investment bank? This paper evaluates the efficiency of different measures for grant-ing state aid. We use a theoretical model with firms that differ in their creditworthiness and compare different types of subsidies with indirect subsidization through public banks. We find that, in a large parameter range, the politician prefers public banks to direct subsidies because they avoid windfall gains to entrepreneurs and they econo-mize on screening costs. For similar reasons, they may increase social welfare rela-tive to subsidies. One important prerequisite for this result is that public banks must not be allowed to fully compete with private banks. However, from a welfare perspec-tive, a politician uses public banks inefficiently often.
Schlagwörter: 
Public bank
development bank
state aid
subsidies
governance
JEL: 
G21
G38
H25
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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