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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26929
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Bechtold, Stefan | en |
dc.contributor.author | Höffler, Felix | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-12-12 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-08-06T09:27:52Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-08-06T09:27:52Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26929 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The economic analysis of trade-secret protection has traditionally focused on the interests of companies to conceal information from competitors in order to gain competitive advantage through trade-secret law. This has neglected cases in which the interest is not in concealing information from competi- tors, but from trading partners. We investigate the social e¢ ciency e¤ects of trade-secret protection in such cases. Many results from economic theory state that asymmetric information (and therefore also its legal protection) is socially undesirable since it leads to ine¢ cient trade. At the same time, protecting private information might create incentives for socially desirable investments. We model this trade-o¤ in a simple buyer-seller model and nd that, indeed, trade-secret protection has ambiguous welfare e¤ects. However, a simple, informationally undemanding rule, conditioning the applicability of legal protection on a minimum investment by the informed party to conceal the information, helps to apply trade-secret protection only when it increases welfare. This rationalizes important features of current legal practice, but sug- gests that the e¤ort to conceal rather than the e¤ort to reveal the information should play a role when deciding whether or not trade secret protection should be granted. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2007,18 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K2 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | disclosure of information | en |
dc.subject.keyword | hold-up problems | en |
dc.subject.keyword | trade secrets | en |
dc.subject.stw | Geschäftsgeheimnis | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Informationsverhalten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wohlfahrtseffekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | An economic analysis of trade-secret protection in buyer-seller relationships | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 551634014 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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