Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBechtold, Stefanen_US
dc.contributor.authorHöffler, Felixen_US
dc.description.abstractThe economic analysis of trade-secret protection has traditionally focused on the interests of companies to conceal information from competitors in order to gain competitive advantage through trade-secret law. This has neglected cases in which the interest is not in concealing information from competi- tors, but from trading partners. We investigate the social e¢ ciency e¤ects of trade-secret protection in such cases. Many results from economic theory state that asymmetric information (and therefore also its legal protection) is socially undesirable since it leads to ine¢ cient trade. At the same time, protecting private information might create incentives for socially desirable investments. We model this trade-o¤ in a simple buyer-seller model and …nd that, indeed, trade-secret protection has ambiguous welfare e¤ects. However, a simple, informationally undemanding rule, conditioning the applicability of legal protection on a minimum investment by the informed party to conceal the information, helps to apply trade-secret protection only when it increases welfare. This rationalizes important features of current legal practice, but sug- gests that the e¤ort to conceal rather than the e¤ort to reveal the information should play a role when deciding whether or not trade secret protection should be granted.en_US
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods|cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods|x2007,18en_US
dc.subject.keyworddisclosure of informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordhold-up problemsen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrade secretsen_US
dc.titleAn economic analysis of trade-secret protection in buyer-seller relationshipsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US

Files in This Item:
513.28 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.