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dc.contributor.authorBechtold, Stefanen
dc.contributor.authorHöffler, Felixen
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-12-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:27:52Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:27:52Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26929-
dc.description.abstractThe economic analysis of trade-secret protection has traditionally focused on the interests of companies to conceal information from competitors in order to gain competitive advantage through trade-secret law. This has neglected cases in which the interest is not in concealing information from competi- tors, but from trading partners. We investigate the social e¢ ciency e¤ects of trade-secret protection in such cases. Many results from economic theory state that asymmetric information (and therefore also its legal protection) is socially undesirable since it leads to ine¢ cient trade. At the same time, protecting private information might create incentives for socially desirable investments. We model this trade-o¤ in a simple buyer-seller model and …nd that, indeed, trade-secret protection has ambiguous welfare e¤ects. However, a simple, informationally undemanding rule, conditioning the applicability of legal protection on a minimum investment by the informed party to conceal the information, helps to apply trade-secret protection only when it increases welfare. This rationalizes important features of current legal practice, but sug- gests that the e¤ort to conceal rather than the e¤ort to reveal the information should play a role when deciding whether or not trade secret protection should be granted.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2007,18en
dc.subject.jelK2en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddisclosure of informationen
dc.subject.keywordhold-up problemsen
dc.subject.keywordtrade secretsen
dc.subject.stwGeschäftsgeheimnisen
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleAn economic analysis of trade-secret protection in buyer-seller relationships-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn551634014en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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