Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26902 
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dc.contributor.authorBierbrauer, Felixen
dc.contributor.authorSahm, Marcoen
dc.date.accessioned2006-12-13-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:27:32Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:27:32Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26902-
dc.description.abstractWe study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the optimal utilitarian provision rule. The relevant incentive constraints for information aggregation ensure that individuals behave as if they were engaging in informative voting over the level of public good provision. It is shown that the use of information by an optimal provision rule is inversely related to the polarization of preferences which results from the properties of the skill distribution.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2006,18en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinformation aggregationen
dc.subject.keywordinformative votingen
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.keywordtwo-dimensional heterogeneityen
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleInformative voting and the Samuelson rule-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn521158613en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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