Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/268424 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
QUCEH Working Paper Series No. 23-03
Publisher: 
Queen's University Centre for Economic History (QUCEH), Belfast
Abstract: 
This paper revisits the Swedish banking crisis (1919-26) that materialized as post war deflation replaced wartime inflation (1914-18). Inspired by Fisher's 'debt deflation theory', we employ survival analysis to 'predict' which banks would fail, given certain ex-ante bank characteristics. Our tests support the theory; maturity structures mattered most in a regime of falling prices, with vulnerable shorter-term customer loans and bank liabilities representing the most consistent cause of bank distress in the crisis. Similarly, stronger growth in i) leverage, ii) weaker collateral loans and iii) foreign borrowing during the boom were all associated with bank failure in post-war Sweden (1919-26).
Subjects: 
banking crisis
survival analysis
early warning indicators
debt deflation
maturity mismatch
Sweden
JEL: 
E58
G01
G21
G28
N24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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