Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/267890 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
ILE Working Paper Series No. 66
Publisher: 
University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE), Hamburg
Abstract: 
This article offers a concise typology of spontaneous norms - i.e., norms that are formed or sustained through decentralized collective behavior in a community. The typology combines three criteria for identifying spontaneous norms: (i) implicit formation of (customary) rules, as opposed to explicit formation; (ii) enforcement through decentralized sanctioning actions, as opposed to enforcement by a special social agent; (iii) private interpretation of compliance with rules, as opposed to the presence of a public interpreter of compliance. The paper also suggests how identified types can be modeled game-theoretically as repeated games. It is argued that structural differences between various types of spontaneous norms can be best understood as differences in the sequence of play in a stage game. Further, the typology is illustrated with examples from legal history and legal anthropology. Supposedly dissimilar systems of norms (e.g., customary international law and primitive law; norms of warfare and domestic social norms) are shown to exhibit structural resemblance.
Subjects: 
spontaneous norms
custom
customary law
social norms
comparative legal history
typology
JEL: 
B41
K00
N40
O17
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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