Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/267798 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1186
Publisher: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Abstract: 
Each agent in a market needs to supplement his skill with a particular skill of another agent to complete his project. A platform matches the agents and allows members of the same match to share their skills. A match is valuable to an agent if he is matched with any agent who possesses a skill complementary to his own skill. When the platform uses the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy, we study the properties of incentive compatible mechanisms in relation to the reciprocal property of the complementary relationships among different skills, and when the market expands in its size.
Subjects: 
platform
network externalities
divide and conquer
revenue maximization
ex post IC
JEL: 
D42
D47
D62
D82
L12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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