Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265648 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
31st European Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "Reining in Digital Platforms? Challenging monopolies, promoting competition and developing regulatory regimes", Gothenburg, Sweden, 20th - 21st June 2022
Publisher: 
International Telecommunications Society (ITS), Calgary
Abstract: 
Despite an ecosystem of falsehoods propagated by the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwanese citizens re-elected the pro-independence candidate Tsai Ing-wen as their president for a second term on January 11, 2020. Several months later, on November 15, Maia Sandu, a Harvard-educated economist who supports closer ties with the European Union, won Moldova's presidential election against a tapestry of false information favoring pro-Moscow incumbent President Igor Dodon. The proliferation of disinformation in Moldova and Taiwan should cripple to the electoral processes of these young democracies. The victories of President Tsai and President Sandu suggest that there are limits to which targeted foreign disinformation can disrupt, divide, confuse, or otherwise damage political cohesion or a target audience's understanding of reality; signifying that the pre-existing belief systems and social networks can play a pivotal role in constraining the natural flow of disinformation within a society. While the technological tools have evolved, the use of political disinformation-the purposeful use of misleading or manipulative information to subvert political discourse and confuse, divide, or negatively influence the public-is not a new phenomenon (Woolley & Joseff, 2020). Modern-day states, like China and Russia, have used disinformation campaigns to achieve their strategic objectives. Russian military intelligence materials state, "Psychological warfare has existed as long as man himself" (Kovalev, 2017). During the Cold War, Soviet policy integrated disinformation and malign influence operations, involving the Communist Party and state structure. In 1937, China established the United Front Work Department (UFWD), directing heterodox and hybrid means to conduct influence operations targeting foreign actors and states that oppose the policies and authority of its ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Bowe, 2018). At present, the UFWD's work enshrines former Chairman Mao Zedong's doctrine: "Anyone wanting to overthrow a political regime must create public opinion and do some preparatory ideological work" (Mao, 1974). (...)
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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