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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. WP 2022-07
Verlag: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, I explore how optimal aggregate dynamics can be shaped by the presence of moral hazard in unemployment insurance. I also analyze the optimal provision of unemployment insurance and the implications for the amount of cross-sectional heterogeneity. The economy that I consider embeds the Hopenhayn-Nicolini unemployment insurance model into a real business cycle model with search frictions. In a calibrated version I find that the presence of private information has large effects on optimal aggregate steady-state dynamics but not on aggregate fluctuations. In addition, I find that optimal consumption replacement ratios are approximately independent of the business cycle.
Schlagwörter: 
Private information
Mechanism Design
Business Cycles
Moral hazard
Unemployment Insurance
JEL: 
D82
E32
J64
J65
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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