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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26293
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Bellettini, Giorgio | en |
dc.contributor.author | Kempf, Hubert | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-03-27 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-28T08:30:06Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-28T08:30:06Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26293 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we tackle the issue of locating a public facility which provides a public good in a closed and populated territory. This facility generates differentiated benefits to neighborhoods depending on their distance from it. In the case of a Nimby facility, the smaller is the distance, the lower is the individual benefit. The opposite is true in the case of an anti-Nimby facility. We first characterize the optimal location which would be chosen by a social planner. Then we introduce a common-agency lobbying game, where agents attempt to influence the location and provision decisions by the government. Some interesting results arise in the case where only a subset of neighborhoods lobby. First, the solution of the lobbying game can replicate the optimal solution. Second, under-provision and over-provision of the public good may be obtained both in the Nimby and the anti-Nimby cases. The provision outcome depends on the presence of either a congestion effect or an agglomeration effect. Third, some non-lobbying neighborhoods may be better off than in the case where all neighborhoods lobby, which raises the possibility of free-riding at the lobbying stage. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x2248 | en |
dc.subject.jel | R00 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentliche Einrichtung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Standortwahl | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentliches Gut | en |
dc.subject.stw | Externer Effekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Interessenpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Why not in your backyard?: on the location and size of a public facility | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 560499094 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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